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Ecological Explanation between
Manipulation and Mechanism
Description
Viorel Pâslaru†‡
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’
approach to that case satisfies Woodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism,
but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new
mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but
I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in
ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations
possible.

1. Introduction. A number of philosophers of science have argued based
on case studies from various areas of biology that mechanisms are essential
for understanding biological phenomena, and description of mechanisms
underlying phenomena adequately accounts for the explanatory practice
of scientists (Glennan 1996, 2002, 2005; Machamer, Darden, and Craver
2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel 2006). This view has been
called the new mechanistic philosophy (NMP hereafter; Skipper and Mill†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton,
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stein 2005). James Woodward (2003), on the other hand, argues that an
explanation uncovers patterns of systematic counterfactual dependence.
On the same basis, he (Woodward 2002) also formulates a counterfactual
account of mechanisms. Ecology offers cases that show that although
Woodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism are satisfied, they
do not fully capture what ecologists regard as explanatory. Instead, they
seek to explain how dependencies arise. Utilizing the resources of NMP,
I show in what respect explanation in ecology consists in outlining the
mechanism underlying counterfactual dependencies. Additionally, I argue
that Woodward’s view offers a simple way to account for overall relationship between components of a mechanism and its output. In light of
this analysis and based on his notions of invariance and insensitivity of
causal relationships, I suggest that we should use a mixed approach to
account for explanation in ecology. Explanation in this field involves revealing invariant and insensitive causal relationships, and specifications
of these relations require descriptions of the entities involved, their properties, and functions.
2. Woodward on Explanation. Woodward offers a causal conception of
explanation conceived along manipulationist and counterfactual lines.
A causal explanation shows how an outcome hinges upon other variables,
such that if we could intervene and manipulate the value of one or more
variables, then we could change the value of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Explanatory information is relevant to both cases of actual and
potential manipulation and answers what-if-things-had-been-different
questions. Woodward argues that the minimal condition of scientific explanation should be understood thus:
(EXP) Suppose that M is an explanandum consisting in the statement
that some variable Y takes the particular value y. Then an explanans
Exps1 for M will consist of (a) a generalization G relating changes
in the value(s) of a variable X (where X may itself be a vector or ntuple of variables Xi) and changes in Y, and (b) a statement (of initial
or boundary conditions) that the variable X takes the particular value
x. A necessary and sufficient condition for Exps to be (minimally)
explanatory with respect to M is that (i) Exps and M be true or
approximately so; (ii) according to G, Y takes the value y under an
intervention in which X takes the value x; (iii) there is some intervention that changes the value of X from x to x  where x ( x , with
1. Woodward uses the letter E here. To avoid confusions with E, the variable electric
intensity in the example below, I am using Exps to refer to the explanans.
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G correctly describing the value y  that Y would assume under this
intervention, where y  ( y. (2003, 203)
As an illustration of EXP, consider the case of an explanation using
Coulomb’s law of the magnitude of the electric intensity at a certain
distance from a wire. The term M is the statement that the magnitude of
electric intensity at a particular distance r from a long wire has a particular
value y . The explanans Exps for M consists of (a) the generalization G
E p (1/2p 0)(l/r)

(1)

that relates changes in the value(s) of variable X, that is (1/2pe 0 )(l/r),
and changes in E, which corresponds to Y in EXP, and (b) a statement
that, say, li (charge per unit length along the wire) takes a particular value
li⫹1. As for the necessary and sufficient conditions for Exps to be minimally explanatory, (i) measurements show that Exps and M are true; (ii)
the value of E changes due to an intervention that modifies the value of
l; (iii) there was an intervention that changed the value of l from li to
li⫹1 and G accurately describes the value of E that changes from Ei to
Ei⫹1 due to this intervention on the value of l. Similar considerations
apply to other components of the right-hand-side part of (1), which allows
one to see how changes in the values of r modify the intensity of the field
E (Woodward 2003).
In the next section, I examine the case of ecological research on the
relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (hereafter the
biodiversity case) and show that the way ecologists approach it satisfies
Woodward’s account of explanation. Despite that, I argue that ecologists
accept patterns of systematic dependence as mere descriptions, but not
as explanatory relations. Instead, what they take to be explanatory is a
description of the mechanism that produces patterns of dependence.
3. The Biodiversity–Ecosystem Functioning Case. In the 1990s, ecologists
conducted a series of experiments aimed at testing hypotheses that changes
in biodiversity affect ecosystem functioning. The term “biodiversity” has
broad scope, refers to genetic, organismal, and ecological diversity over
spatial and temporal scales, and is not limited to the number of species
present in a certain area (Harper and Hawksworth 1994). Given that
“biodiversity” has a wide scope, and hypotheses regarding this set of issues
are characterized more specifically, a few terminological clarifications are
required. Functional traits are characteristics of a species that are relevant
to its response to the environment (e.g., shade-tolerant and shade-intolerant species, seed size, and dispersal mode) and/or to its effects on ecosystem functioning, which is the flow of energy and materials through
biotic and abiotic components of an ecosystem and encompasses ecosys-
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tem processes, such as primary production, trophic transfer from plants
to animals, nutrient cycling, water dynamics, and heat transfer (Dı́az and
Cabido 2001, 654). Diversity of these functional traits makes up functional
diversity. Species that share the same functional traits form a functional
group, such that functional diversity is also defined as diversity of functional groups. As for ecosystem functioning, it comprises the processes of
energy and materials flow through the biotic and abiotic components of
an ecosystem, like trophic transfer from plants to animals and nutrient
cycling (Dı́az and Cabido 2001). In the experimental studies on biodiversity, ecosystem productivity conceived as biomass production is an instance of ecosystem functioning that is commonly monitored.
The experimental studies and their findings that I am considering are
part of a growing consensus that it is the functional traits of species and
their interactions rather than species numbers per se that are a greater
determinant of ecosystem processes (Dı́az and Cabido 2001; Hooper et
al. 2005). The often-examined hypothesis is that decrease in functional
diversity negatively affects ecosystem functioning, for example, ecosystem
productivity. Tilman, Knops, et al. (1997) performed a series of field
experiments that show how ecosystem functioning responds to varying
functional diversity. In one of them, they planted 289 plots with 0, 1, 2,
4, 8, 16, or 32 savanna-grassland species representing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5
plant functional groups (Tilman, Knops, et al. 1997). Plants were assigned
to functional groups based on intrinsic physiological and morphological
differences that influence their resource requirements, seasonality of
growth, and life history. The response variables monitored were plant
productivity, plant total N, soil NO3, soil NH4, plant percent N, and light
penetration. Statistical analysis of the experimental results established that
functional diversity was a significant determinant of response variables,
but the numbers of species were not. Tilman et al. concluded from this
that functional diversity is a greater determinant of ecosystem processes
than species diversity. Statistical analysis of the effects of functional composition (conceived of as which functional groups were added to plots)
nested within functional diversity revealed that functional diversity and
composition together explained 37% of the variance in response variables,
while species and functional diversity together explained 8%, indicating
that composition is the greater determinant of ecosystem processes.
The finding of Tilman et al. satisfies the conditions of explanations
stipulated by Woodward in EXP. The explanandum M consists in the
statement that the variable Y—one of the ecosystem processes measured,
say, ecosystem productivity—changes its value from low to high. The
explanans Exps for M is the generalization G, “Increased functional diversity increases productivity,” and the statement “The value of the variable X, functional diversity, increases.” The explanans satisfies the nec-
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essary and sufficient conditions to be minimally explanatory with respect
to M: (i) Exps and M are true; they have been confirmed experimentally;
(ii) there is a generalization G according to which productivity increases
under an intervention on functional diversity that increases the number
of functional groups; (iii) there is also an intervention that changes the
value of functional diversity from low to high and G correctly describes
the resulting change in productivity from low to high.
Despite the satisfaction of Woodward’s conditions for explanation, Tilman, Knops, et al. (1997) do not consider dependence relations to be
explanatory. Instead, they suggest that mechanisms of niche differentiation
and coexistence are able to explain the increase in productivity with diversity. In a more theoretical article devoted to their experimental findings,
they offer three models “that provide simple mechanisms that explain how
such dependencies arise and help resolve the controversy over the importance for ecosystem functioning of species identity versus species diversity”
(my emphasis; Tilman, Lehman, and Thomson 1997, 1857). Tilman et al.
expressed a similar dissatisfaction with the dependence relationships being
explanatory in an earlier article in which they reported the results of a
field experiment that manipulated the numbers of species per plot. One
hundred and forty-seven plots were planted with either 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12,
or 24 species randomly drawn from a pool of 24 North American prairie
species. The experiment demonstrated that the ecosystem processes of
plant productivity and resource utilization were significantly greater in
plots with higher plant diversity. However, they seem not to regard this
finding as explanatorily sufficient, since they conclude: “Further work is
needed to determine how interspecific morphological and physiological
differences influence the dependence of ecosystem functioning on biodiversity in this and other ecosystems” (Tilman, Wedin, and Knops 1996,
720). Shaheed Naeem, who carried out laboratory experiments on the
biodiversity–ecosystem processes relationship, arrived at a similar conclusion. He argued that dependence relations guide us toward identifying
the underlying mechanisms, which are the research goals (Naeem 2002).
Thus Woodward’s account of explanation does not capture what ecologists regard as explanatory. Their work shows that an explanation rather
consists in articulating the mechanism that produces the phenomenon to
be explained. The next step of this paper is to examine ecologists’ view
on the mechanisms underlying the biodiversity–ecosystem functioning relationship, since they emphasize the explanatory role of mechanisms.
4. An Ecological Mechanism Underlying the Biodiversity–Ecosystem Functioning Relationship. Niche complementarity is one of the mechanisms
articulated to account for the dependence of ecosystem functioning on
biodiversity. This mechanism is based on species differences and their
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interactions (Tilman, Knops, et al. 1997; Dı́az and Cabido 2001). The
simplest case of niche complementarity is when two species of plants have
different requirements for a limiting resource, say, light. In this case, niche
complementarity occurs when there is a shade-intolerant species and a
shade-tolerant species. This combination is also called an intercrop, and
the combination of such complementary species, intercropping (Vandermeer 1989). Figure 1 illustrates the positioning of the shade-intolerant
and shade-tolerant species.
Each leaf layer consists of leaves that photosynthesize at a rate corresponding to the light conditions of that layer and respire at a rate of a
unit per leaf. Net assimilation is positive for the first four levels but turns
negative for layers 5, 6, and 7. At this level of light, the shade-intolerant
species does not find adequate conditions. By contrast, the shade-tolerant
species is able to develop well. Thus, layers 5, 6, and 7 represent a different
niche that is suitable for the shade-tolerant species but not for the shadeintolerant species, which finds its adequate conditions in the niche represented by levels 1–4. Data from tables accompanying the figure show
that when both species occupy their niches—which amounts to niche
complementarity—solar radiation is utilized more efficiently such that
photosynthesis, respiration, and net assimilation rates are increased for
both species. And this translates into higher biomass production and
higher ecosystem productivity. This happens, however, only when the
shade-tolerant species is present, not if the shade-intolerant species grows
more leaves. The shade-tolerant species positively affects the shadeintolerant species by preventing the leaves of the lower leaf layer from
being a respiratory drainage on the shade-intolerant species. Plant morphology is a further determinant of this interspecific interaction and of
how efficiently available solar radiation is utilized. In particular, different
leaf morphologies and the number of leaves on each level determine differentially the percentage of the occupied leaf area at that level. If the
total percentage across all levels is higher, then the total light assimilation
and, ipso facto, biomass production is higher.
In sum, niche complemetarity involves that organisms of different species are different in their functional traits, which determine species’ differential use of resources and nutrient use efficiency. Furthermore, a composition of species with different functional traits that allows them to
more efficiently use a greater amount of resources from different ranges
increases ecosystem productivity. Hence the greater the number of functional groups, the greater the overall ecosystem productivity is. Organisms
of different functional groups occupy distinct niches and can exploit their
resources differently. That increases their body mass and, consequently,
the overall productivity of the ecosystem is greater. In the next section, I
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Figure 1. Niche complementarity. The top of the figure represents a shade-intolerant
species; the bottom shows an intercrop of shade-intolerant and shade-tolerant species.
Shaded ellipses below the leaves of the shade-intolerant species represent the shadetolerant species. Figure from Vandermeer 1989, 73. Reprinted with permission.
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will consider Woodward’s view on mechanisms and confront it with ecologists’ perspective on the niche complementarity mechanism.
5. Woodward on Mechanisms. Woodward developed the underlying idea
of his conception on explanation into a view on mechanisms. In his 2002
article, he promises to offer a characterization of the notion “mechanism”
that would be more general and less discipline specific. The characterization, however, is rather of models of mechanisms than of mechanisms
themselves. According to Woodward:
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an acceptable model of a mechanism is that the representation (i) describe
an organized or structured set of parts or components, where (ii) the
behavior of each component is described by a generalization that is
invariant under interventions, and where (iii) the generalizations governing each component are also independently changeable, and where
(iv) the representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and
(iii), the overall output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the input to each component and changes in the components
themselves. (2002, S375)
A block sliding down an inclined plane is Woodward’s simple example
that illustrates features that even more complex mechanisms possess. The
behavior of the block is determined by two forces—a force due to friction
directed against the motion of the block and a gravitational force due to
the weight of the block. The frictional force is given by the relationship
(1) Fk p mk N, while the net force exerted on the block along the plane
obeys the relationship (2) Fnet p mg sin ø ⫺ mg cos ø (2002, S367). Woodward underscores two aspects of mechanisms understood counterfactually.
First, he understands the productive behavior of parts of a mechanism
in the general terms of causal relationships, which are invariant and can
be used for manipulation and control. This idea is expressed in MECH
by (ii). Consider relationship (1) Fk p mk N. The behavior of N is productive relative to Fk in the sense that changes to the value of N bring
about changes in the value of Fk, and the relationship Fk p mk N is invariant
under at least a certain range of interventions that modify the value of
N. And we can control and manipulate the value of Fk by controlling and
manipulating the value of N. The second aspect is that mechanisms are
modular. This facet is expressed in MECH by (ii). A mechanism is modular
in the sense that it is possible to intervene to manipulate a component
without affecting the behavior of other components. With respect to the
sliding block example, this means that we can modify the component due
to gravitational force and its generalization, without changing the component due to frictional force and its generalization. One can change Fk
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of (1) by modifying the characteristics of the surface of the plane, which
affects mk, but this will not affect the generalization regarding the gravitational component. And one can change the gravitational force by modifying the value of g, say, by moving the plane to a weaker gravitational
field, but this will not change the relationship governing the frictional
force component.
I consider next how Woodward’s account of mechanisms fares when
confronted with the niche complementarity mechanism. Applied to this
case, the counterfactual view on mechanisms would tell us that an acceptable model of the mechanism of niche complementarity shows how
the mechanism output, biomass production, will vary under manipulation
of the input to its components. MECH (i) requires that to be acceptable,
a model of this mechanism needs to describe an organized or structured
set of parts or components. Ecologists’ description presents the shadetolerant, the shade-intolerant species, and the sunlight as the components
of niche complementarity. Given MECH (ii), the generalizations invariant
under interventions that describe the behavior of the components would
be those that would refer to the photosynthetic behavior of plants and
sunlight. Thus, (a) ‘ST is a species able to carry out photosynthesis within
a certain range of low light intensity’ would describe the behavior of the
shade-tolerant species, while (b) ‘SI is a species able to carry out photosynthesis within a certain range of high light intensity’ would describe the
behavior of the shade-intolerant species. Presumably, a generalization
about sunlight would be this: (c) ‘Light diminishes as it passes through
the canopy’. These statements would remain invariant under a certain
range of interventions on the genotype of these species that modify their
light tolerance limits and photosynthetic capacities, or on the amount of
light emitted by the sun. Additionally, the niche complementarity model
implies generalizations that link the presence of species to biomass production, as well as generalizations describing the relationships between
various species in a community. These generalizations, which are likewise
invariant under a range of interventions, could be formulated thus: (d)
‘An increase in the number of species in a habitat increases biomass
production’; (e) ‘A shade-tolerant species is present in a habitat if a shadeintolerant species is present.’ MECH (iii) demands that these generalizations be independently changeable. Niche complementarity seems to
satisfy this condition. That a species is shade-tolerant is independent of
the other species being shade-intolerant, and the generalizations that reflect this are independently changeable as well. One can intervene and
modify, for instance by genetically engineering the shade-tolerant species
so that it becomes less shade tolerant, or by simply removing it. Yet this
will not change the shade-intolerant species. Likewise, one can change
the light source, but this will not modify the plant species. Thus, the niche
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complementarity mechanism is modular. According to MECH (iv), the
model of the niche complementarity should allow us to see how productivity varies under manipulation of the components. Given generalizations
a, b, and c, and generalization d, one could infer that adding new species
to the habitat would increase the productivity of the system. Additionally,
considering generalization e, it could be expected that an intervention that
removes the shade-intolerant species will affect the shade-tolerant species
and biomass production.
Woodward’s approach suggests that mechanisms are networks of invariant causal relationships. A correct representation of this mechanism
would show what would happen in various hypothetical experiments to
the output of the mechanism if various interventions on the components
would be performed. The key goal of this representation is to capture
dependency relationships between the values of variables that can be elicited through interventions on the mechanisms under scrutiny. His notion
of mechanisms captures only the overall relationship of dependence of
the mechanism product on its components, but it does not show how that
relationship arises. The preceding discussion of the biodiversity case
showed that the explanatory goal of ecologists goes beyond documenting
the counterfactual dependencies. Rather, they seek to uncover how stable,
dependency relationships between relata arise. Consequently, when compared with the interests of aforementioned ecologists, Woodward’s account of mechanisms turns out not to capture all the meanings of their
concept of ecological mechanism and explanatory standards. David Tilman is one of the leading researchers on the problem of the relationship
biodiversity–ecosystem functioning. Discussing the standards of mechanistic approach to competition, which is one of the factors that underlies
niche complementarity, he raises this expectation about good ecological
explanations: “I define the study of competition as mechanistic if it includes both the direct processes by which competition occurs and information on physiology, morphology, and/or behavior of individual species
or functional groups relevant to that direct process. . . . A major goal
of the mechanistic approach is to use information on the physiology,
morphology, and/or behavior of individual species to predict the outcome
of pairwise or multispecies interactions” (1987, 771).
Ecologists’ approach to niche complementarity satisfies this expectation. They offer information on the physiology and morphology of plants,
as well as physical processes that underlie the relationship biodiversityproductivity. More specifically, this is information on photosynthetic rates
and capacities, rates of light assimilation, rates of respiration, plants’
tolerance to different intensities of sunlight, shape of leaves, their numbers
and location on each layer, as well as changes in the amount of sunlight
as it passes through the canopy and as it changes during the day. Thus,
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this relatively simple case shows that ecological explanations require more
than just specification of invariant generalizations about the behavior of
components and how the overall output of the mechanism varies under
interventions on the input to each component.
The limitations of Woodward’s view on mechanisms do not justify
abandoning his proposal, though. A significant part of research on biodiversity aims to establish how biomass production, or other ecosystem
processes, varies given variations in functional groups, functional composition, and species numbers. Ecologists also look to reveal how the
presence of one species is responsible for the presence of a different species
or a cohort of species. That is, part of the work of ecologists is to establish
causal relationships, and Woodward’s perspective on explanation and
mechanisms accounts for this facet of ecological research.
Woodward discusses only a necessary condition for a representation to
be an acceptable model of a mechanism so that limitations are to be
expected. I turn now to views that aim to give complete accounts of mechanisms.
6. The New Mechanistic Philosophy and the Mechanism of Niche Complementarity. Tilman’s specification of what counts as an acceptable and
mechanistic explanation in ecology, on the one hand, and the illustration
of the niche complementarity, on the other hand, suggest that NMP would
be a better view to deal with explanations in ecology and ecological mechanisms. There are important differences between the conceptions of philosophers that support NMP. I will focus, however, on what unites them.
Glennan, Machamer et al., and Bechtel are committed to the following
theses:2
1.

2.

Mechanisms produce phenomena. The working of a mechanism as a
whole performs certain behaviors. For example, a mousetrap traps
mice. A consequence of this thesis is that describing the mechanism
responsible for the phenomenon under scrutiny amounts to an explanation of that phenomenon.
Mechanisms are compositional. Mechanisms have working parts. The
parts are relevant to the working of a mechanism in virtue of some
of their properties but not all of them. The rigidity of the bar and
the tension of the spring are central for the mousetrap to catch mice,
but not the color of the platform. Glennan calls the parts objects,

2. Craver and Bechtel (2006) explain the notion of mechanism along four aspects: the
phenomenal aspect, the componential aspect, the causal aspect, and the organizational
aspect. Here, I follow their lead.
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which are relatively highly robust and stable in the absence of interventions. Machamer et al. take both entities and their activities
to be the components. By “entities” Machamer et al. mean things.
Bechtel makes a point similar to that of Machamer et al., because
he speaks in his characterization of mechanisms about component
parts and component operations.
Causal relations constitute mechanisms. The components of a mechanism act and interact and in this way they are able to produce a
behavior. The goal of a mechanistic explanation is to specify the
relevant causal relations among the components in terms that offer
more appropriate accounts of causing exhibited in the particular
cases under scrutiny (Craver and Bechtel 2006, 470). Glennan thinks
in terms of interactions between parts of the mechanism. Machamer
et al. conceive of them in terms of activities of parts, indicated by
verbs and verbal forms, while Bechtel prefers operations of parts.
Components of mechanisms must be organized. To produce a phenomenon, the components and their causal relations must be organized spatially and temporally. Spatial organization includes location, shape, size, orientation, connection, and boundaries of
components. Temporal organization comprises order, rate, duration,
and frequencies of activities. For example, the trigger bar restrains
the impact bar because it is stuck in the catch. As for temporal
organization, a mousetrap must work quickly, and there should not
be delays between the steps of the working. The new mechanistic
philosophers focus on these mechanisms that have a rather stable
organization: toilet; electric switch; the heart; and the mechanism
of action potential, of DNA transcription, and of protein synthesis.

The theses of NMP capture some important facets of ecological mechanisms. (1) Ecologists see mechanisms as being responsible for a certain
output. In this respect, Tilman, Lehman, and Thomson (1997) claim that
the niche complementarity mechanism may explain why productivity increases with diversity. (2) From the viewpoint of NMP, the components
of the niche differentiation mechanism would be the individual organisms
and sunlight. This focus on the individual level is consistent with the claim
of ecologists that certain mechanisms—for instance the mechanism of
competition—operate at the individual level (Tilman 1990). If photosynthesis or respiration are the relevant activities, then relating them to the
individual level is supported by the fact that these activities require certain
physiological systems and these are to be found at the level of organisms.
Yet ecologists extrapolate from the individual level to the population level
and often speak about species, or functional groups, as being the relevant
components. However, the species as a cohort of individuals does not
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have the proper physiological system able to produce photosynthesis or
respiration. (3) Respiration, photosynthesis, assimilation are activities, or
operations whose specification is key to articulating an explanation of the
interaction between organisms of two species. (4) Organization of components is central in ecologists’ discussion of niche differentiation. The
shade-tolerant plant has to be in close proximity to the shade-intolerant
plant so that it can be protected from excess of sunlight. Thus, the plants
have to be spatially organized. Duration and variation of sunlight during
the day as well as the rates of respiration, of photosynthesis, and of
assimilation are instances of temporal organization, and, in addition, they
are measured at each layer, which is a facet of spatial organization. Geometry of leaves is considered as well. Their shape and size are decisive
for the ability of plants to interact in a manner that creates niche complementarity.
NMP successfully captures the aforementioned aspects of the mechanism of niche complementarity, but it encounters difficulties when it tries
to account for what is remarkable about mechanisms—namely, that they,
to paraphrase Machamer et al., work always, or for the most part, in the
same way under different conditions. Niche complementarity functions
despite various changes in its components and background conditions.
For example, organisms of various shade-tolerant species can play the
role of the shade-tolerant plant. Moreover, the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem processes holds despite variations in the number
of species involved, their identity, the number of functional groups, and
variations in the environment. This compositional variation implies variations in the organization of the mechanism, and in the activities/operations and interactions of its components, yet ecologists think that it is
the same mechanism. This aspect of the mechanism is harder to capture
with the resources of NMP because of its merit: formulation of a more
specific account of the causation exhibited in the particular case under
scrutiny. Recall that to fulfill this desideratum, NMP requires that we be
specific about the activities, operations, or interactions that take place.
This obscures, however, that there is an overall causal relationship between
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning that is not affected by various
changes. My positive proposal addresses this issue and builds on the
contributions of Woodward and NMP.
7. Mechanisms and Networks of Causal Relationships. A solution to the
problem of mechanisms working in the same way under different conditions could be obtained by rehabilitating the causal relations that the
abstract terms “cause” and “causal” refer to. To this end, I rely on Thagard’s (1998) proposal to conceive of mechanisms in terms of causal networks and Woodward’s suggestion to use the notions of invariance and
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insensitivity to think about mechanisms.3 A distinctive feature of causal
relationships is that they are invariant, that is, they remain stable across
various changes in the values of variables of the causal relationship X-Y.
Causal relationships are also insensitive, meaning that they are not affected
by modifications in the background conditions of variables X and Y or
by changes in the actual circumstances of the relationship. For example,
the X-Y causal relationship is insensitive if it holds despite modifications
in the Dow-Jones Index or regardless of changes in how specifically X
affects Y (Woodward 2003, 2006).
Invariance characterizes the niche complementarity mechanism in several respects. The overall relationship between biodiversity occupying
complementary niches and ecosystem processes is invariant within a certain range to changes in the number of species, identities of species, and
number of functional groups involved. Productivity will vary under interventions that change the number of species, the number of functional
groups in a community, or the identity of species in functional groups,
yet the overall causal relationship between these factors and productivity
will hold. An increase in biodiversity in complementary niches increases
productivity both in prairies and in forests, lakes, and rivers. The activities
of organisms involved could be photosynthesis, nutrient uptake, or foraging. Niche complementarity would still occur among these organisms,
and it would be invariant to these changes. Furthermore, one can change
the number of individual organisms of a species, and, ipso facto, of a
functional group, and this will affect the productivity, but the overall
causal relationship will not be broken. Tilman’s experiments on the biodiversity–ecosystem processes involved various treatments with nitrogen
and nutrients. The experiment was long term, and it underwent a significant drought, which amounted to an experimental intervention that
changed the levels of limiting resources and factors. The biodiversityproductivity relationship turned out to be insensitive to these changes in
the background, indicating that more diverse ecosystems withstand environmental stresses and are still able to support ecosystem processes.
The same reasoning applies to variations in all other abiotic factors.
The biodiversity-productivity relationship would occur and be insensitive
despite variations—within a range of tolerance of organisms—in temperature, sunlight, or chemical composition of the air. The limiting resource could be sunlight, or water, nitrogen or calcium, or other nutrients.
The biodiversity–ecosystem processes relationship is insensitive to this,
since species will have to be organized in complementary niches to better
3. Woodward made this suggestion during his talk held at the forty-second annual philosophy colloquium at the University of Cincinnati in May 2006. For an earlier proposal
to conceive of mechanisms in terms of causal networks, see Thagard 1998.
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Figure 2. The causal structure of the shade-tolerant–shade-intolerant niche complementarity mechanism. SINT p shade-intolerant, ST p shade tolerant.

use these resources. The causal relationships would occur even if the
landscape changes in different ways. The shade-intolerant and the shadetolerant plants would interact regardless of whether the landscape is a
hill or a valley, and regardless of location and time. Biodiversity can
increase productivity through complementarity both in Europe and in
America. And this series of possible changes in background conditions
could continue, depending on the actual or possible availability of factors
that can directly or indirectly affect any of the components that constitute
the causal relations in this ecological mechanism.
The causal structure of the foregoing case of niche complementarity
involving plants of shade-tolerant and shade-intolerant species could be
represented as in Figure 2. To articulate this representation, I borrow
Levins’s method of loop analysis (1974; Puccia and Levins 1985).
The solid dot lines represent negative causal relations, and the arrow
lines show positive causal relations. A causal relation is negative if it
negatively affects a causal factor, for example, a plant diminishes a resource, say, light. A causal relation is positive if it positively affects a
causal factor. In this case, light positively affects plants by being a source
of their energy, and plants of both species facilitate the growth of each
other. These causal relations, and the entire structure, are invariant and
insensitive in the senses explored above. To this I would add that the
structure is also invariant in the sense that its components could be populations as well as individuals. At the population level, this structure is
invariant to changes in the numbers of individuals of the two species
involved. The population of shade-intolerant species could be more or
less numerous, but the causal relationship between this species and the
shade-tolerant, on the one hand, and between this species and ecosystem
functioning, on the other hand, would still obtain. At the individual level,
the structure is invariant to changes in the size of individual organisms
involved.
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The specification of the causal structure, as illustrated above, identifies
the components involved, but it satisfies only partially the requirement
of mechanistic study. To fully satisfy the requirement, it has to be accompanied by a description of the relevant properties of the components, of
their organization, and of their functions in the particular context. Determining the causal structure between the components of a mechanism
helps show how the details of the description are part of a broader causal
structure. The structure itself is rather impoverished, and Machamer et
al. rightly notice that the abstract causing needs to be specified. However,
there is a hazard in concentrating on specific kinds of causes. Too narrow
of a focus might result in a failure to recognize the overall causal structure.
8. Conclusion. In light of the foregoing examination, I suggest that an
account of explanation in ecology would benefit by integrating the contribution of NMP and Woodward’s notions of invariant and insensitive
causal relationships. Ecological explanations aim to reveal the invariant
and insensitive causal structure of a phenomenon under examination and
to show, in light of the properties of components, their causal roles, and
organization, how this structure is possible. These aspects are complementary, and specifying only one of them does not do justice to the
explanatory expectations of ecologists. Specifying only the causal structures without the mechanistic details offers a general model with wide
applicability but sacrifices its realism. By contrast, describing all the mechanistic details would yield a realistic model, yet with very limited applicability. As the presentation of the biodiversity–ecosystem productivity
showed, ecologists are interested in both general and realistic models.
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